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NOTES
degree by the expense involved in the production of this inci-
dental commodity.
Although the court was not required to pass upon the abstract
question as to whether or not gravel was a mineral, such question
raises extremely interesting problems." If the view should be
taken that the word "minerals" per se was an all inclusive term
under Louisiana's non-ownership theory, oil and gas rights could
be prolonged ad infinitum by the interruption of prescription with
merely the production of gravel or sand. The courts of Louisiana
have so carefully and adequately safeguarded the ten year pre-
scriptive maximum for tying up such valuable rights as oil and
gas under the well established land policy of the state that it
would be a tragedy for an avenue of escape to be now provided
whereby indefinite prolongation of this prescriptive limitation
could be secured by the mere production of sand and gravel, with-
out even a bona fide attempt to search for oil and gas."5
The instant case, nevertheless, should suggest to convey-
ancers that they specifically include gravel in their contracts if
they expect to be certain of obtaining such material, as the inten-
tion test leaves so much room for doubt.
G.R.J.
MINERAL RIGHTS-OBSTACLE TO EXERCISE OF SERVITUDE-ACCRE-
TION-REVERSIONARY INTEREST-Between October 13, 1924, and
April 8, 1925, E. C. White, the owner of a certain tract of land
comprising forty acres, sold all the mineral rights thereunder to
various persons. On April 8, 1925, after recordation of the above
sales, E. C. White, with full warranty of title, sold one-eighth of
the mineral rights of the same tract of land to O'Brien Brothers,
14. Which department of the state would be empowered to grant a gravel
lease-the Conservation Department (falling under the classification of natu-
ral resources) by La. Act 47 of 1940, § 1 of XXI [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1942) §
7789], or the Department of Minerals (treating gravel as a mineral), La. Act
47 of 1940, tit. XXII, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1941) § 7788]. According to an
opinion from the Attorney General's office, introduced into evidence in the
instant case, the Department of Minerals has no power to authorize gravel
leases on property owned by the state.
15. The "paying quantities" test as employed in mineral leases is clearly
inapplicable to determine the problem of user as to mineral servitudes. See
Green v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 146 La. 935, 84 So. 211 (1920); Hunter v.
Booker, 158 La. 690, 104 So. 618 (1925); Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139,
108 So. 314 (1926); Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 172 La. 655, 135 So. 15 (1931); Pace
Lake Gas Co. v. United Carbon Co., 177 La. 529, 148 So. 699 (1933); Producers
Oil & Gas Co. v. Continental Securities Corp., 188 La. 564, 177 So. 668 (1937);
Logan v. Tholl Oil Co., 189 La. 645, 180 So. 473 (1938). See Daggett, Mineral
Rights in Louisiana (1941) 102, § 30.
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Incorporated, who had no knowledge of the previous sales. On
January 15, 1931, the heirs of E. C. White (who inherited all his
right and title), joined with the first purchasers of the mineral
rights in granting a joint lease to the Triangle Drilling Company,
Incorporated, for a primary term of five years, expiring on Janu-
ary 15, 1936. In 1941 a well was drilled on the property. The ques-
tion to which this note is primarily directed' is whether the prior
sale of the mineral rights to others, together with the joint lease,
was such an obstacle as would suspend prescription as to the
rights of O'Brien Brothers, Incorporated. Held, (1) the prior min-
eral servitudes and joint lease was an obstacle within the mean-
ing of Article 792 of the Civil Code, and therefore prescription did
not begin to run against the rights of O'Brien Brothers until the
joint lease expired on January 15, 1936; (2) as the sale to O'Brien
Brothers was of something which the vendor did not possess, the
subsequent acquisition of the title of the property by the vendor
vested title immediately in his vendee. White v. Hodges, 9 So.
(2d) 433 (La. 1942).
Article 792 of the Civil Code 2 applies as well to personal
servitudes as to predial servitudes, although it is found under the
latter title of the Code. The court has on many occasions consid-
ered the applicability of this article to cases concerning mineral
rights.4 In none of them, however, were all the essential re-
quisites for the application of the article found to exist, but the
1. The principal case is the result of the consolidation of six cases com-
menced in the trial court. This note is directed to the questions presented
in the original case of White v. O'Brien Brothers, Inc., which is consolidated
in the report of White v. Hodges. The court held in the other cases that a
joint lease executed by the landowners and the owners of the mineral rights,
would only extend the rights of the mineral owners during the entire term
of the joint lease, in the absence of any showing that the landowners in-
tended to interrupt prescription. There were other points involved too nu-
merous for mention.
2. Art. 792, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the owner of the estate to whom
the servitude is due, is prevented from using it by any obstacle which he
can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonusage does not run
against him as long as this obstacle remains."
3. "Although this article, by Its terms, might seem applicable only to
predial servitudes, the principle on which it is founded is applicable as well
to personal servitudes as to predial servitudes." Hightower v. Maritzky, 194
La. 998, 1005, 195 So. 518, 520 (1940).
4. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931); Myers
v. Cooke, 175 La. 30, 142 So. 790 (1932). The above two cases involve the rule
contra non valentem agene nulla currit praescriptio, which is essentially the
embodiment of Article 792. Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176
La. 333, 145 So. 677 (1933); Coyle v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 187 La. 238,
174 So. 274 (1937); Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939); Galley v.
McFarlain, 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940); Martel v. A. Veeder Co., 199 La.
423, 6 So. (2d) 335 (1942).
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decisions did throw light on what the court considered those re-
quisites to be.5
The present decision seems to establish the rule that the ar-
ticle has no application to an obstacle of which the vendee has
knowledge.6 Furthermore, the decision seems at variance with
the holding in Gailey v. McFarlain,7 to the effect that a prior rec-
ordation of a lease constitutes constructive notice and imputes to
a subsequent purchaser knowledge of the encumbrance." This
must of necessity raise the implication that the court has rejected
the idea of constructive knowledge being supplied by recordation
of a prior sale. The distinction between the two is clear: the ven-
dee of mineral rights subject to a prior recorded lease shares in
the proceeds accruing from the obligations of the lessee to pay
rentals and royalties;9 the vendee of mineral rights which have
been the subject of a prior recorded sale receives absolutely noth-
ing.10 But the equitable justification of such a distinction might
very well be overcome by the opportunity which it affords for the
imposition of fraud.1
A question left open by the court is whether the second ven-
dee, on learning of the prior sale, would be under a duty to re-
scind the sale to him, or tacitly or expressly adopt it as it stands.12
5. For a complete discussion of this subject see Note (1940) 2 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEw 755.
6. This conclusion was first intimated in Sarpy v. Hymel, 40 La. Ann. 425,
4 So. 439 (1888). In Hightower v. Maritzky, 194 La. 998, 1006, 195 So. 518, 520
(1940), the court said: "The article has reference to those obstacles only
which the owner of the servitude or real right has not consented to," citing
Sarpy v. Hymel. See Note (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 755.
7. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940), noted in (1940) 2 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW 752.
8. "The law gives him constructive notice and imputes to him knowledge
of the existence of the lessee's rights by the recordation." Galley v. McFar-
lain, 194 La. 150, 168, 193 So. 570, 576 (1940).
9. Ibid.: "In other words, the law read into the Triche deed the legal
effect that the mineral servitude owners' rights were subject to the mineral
lessees' rights. But the law vested in the servitude owners' favor the bene-
fits flowing from the mineral lessees' obligations to pay rentals and royalties."
10. As to whether he receives the reversionary interest of the landowner
is a matter not at all made clear by the principal case. The point is dis-
cussed more fully in this note.
11. If the court is to continue its highly desirable policy of refusing to
recognize the sale of minerals in perpetuity as dispensing with the ten year
prescriptive period established by law, the step here taken by the court may
have very undesirable results. If a vendee may feel free to purchase mineral
rights without first looking to the record, the landowner could sell them
over and over and thus tie them up forever. It would not be an imposition
on the vendee to require that he look to the public record before purchasing;
It might well nigh be an impossibility to prove that he did look to the record
if he chooses to deny it.
12. 194 La. at 169, 193 So. at 577: "... when the purchaser learns of the
imposition, he is confronted with the duty of repudiating the transaction
against the seller for the alleged fraud or concealment and claiming such
damages as it might have caused him, or expressly or tacitly approving the
transaction."
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The second ground on which the court rests its decision, that of
accretion, might very well obviate the apparent necessity of a
pronouncement on the question by the court, as it seems fairly
well settled under that rule that the vendee is under no obliga-
tion to accept or reject prior to the reacquisition of perfect title
by his vendor-at which time he is conclusively presumed to have
accepted.13 But this rule apparently presupposes that the ven-
dee has acquired no interest in the property by his purchase.
Were it otherwise, he would not be allowed to sit idly by and
claim damages from the landowner for the infringement of rights
which he himself had acquired and would be under a duty to
protect. It therefore results in the instant case that under this
rule, the landowner is under a duty to the vendee to acquire per-
fect title, 5 or respond in damages; but the vendee has no rights
or claims whatsoever to the mineral rights per se. Is this true;
is the vendee completely devoid of any interest in the minerals?
It will be noted that the court at first speaks of obstacle. For
there to be an obstacle to the assertion of a right, there must first
of all be a right. The only right which the vendee can have in
this case is one to have the mineral rights revert to him. To have
that right he must be possessed of the reversionary interest. If
it be said that he has the right to the minerals after they revert to
his vendor, his right is then against the vendor, and not against
the land, of which the minerals form a part. Suppose the vendor
then sold the land. The vendee's only right would be one for dam-
ages against the vendor. Although this is the same result as
would be obtained from the court's second holding, it is obvious
13. Hale v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866); Wolf v. Carter, 131 La.
667, 60 So. 52 (1912); Brewer v. New Orleans Land Co., 154 La. 446, 97 So.
605 (1923). Hennen's Digest, Sale, 1, (c), p. 1325: "Though the sale of an-
other's property be null, yet the vendor's subsequent acquisition of title vests
It at once in the vendee, who cannot afterwards sue for a rescission."
14. The connotation running throughout the cases is that the vendee re-
ceives absolutely nothing until his vendor acquires "perfect title" to all or a
part of the thing sold, or until the vendee accepts the imperfect title which
his vendor had, or has acquired. If the vendee accepts an imperfect title, or
an interest which the vendor has in the thing sold, apparently the vendee
could not thereafter hold the vendor liable for any consequence caused by
the imperfect title. Above all, before acceptance by the vendee, or before
acquisition of perfect title by the vendor, the vendee receives absolutely noth-
ing by his purchase. See Hale v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 321 (1866); Crocker
v. Hoag, 25 La. Ann. 159 (1873); D. & J. D. Edwards v. Fairbanks & Gilman,
27 La. Ann. 449 (1875); Barkley v. Succession of Steers, 47 La. Ann. 951, 17,
So. 438 (1895); Benton v. Sentell, 50 La. Ann. 869, 24 So. 297 (1898); New
Orleans v. Riddell, 113 La. 1051, 37 So. 966 (1905); Wells v. Blackman, 121 La,
394, 46 So. 437 (1908), to the point that the perfect titZe to property acquired
by the vendor after an attempted conveyance by him inures to the benefit
of his vendee.
15. Crocker v. Hoag & Reed, 25 La. Ann. 159 (1873).
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that the obstacle would be one preventing prescription from run-
ning against the vendee's right of action against the vendor,
rather than an obstacle to the assertion of his mineral rights. It
is submitted that such a conclusion is erroneous, and that in the
case of a vendee purchasing a mineral servitude subject to an
obstacle, the reversionary interest of the vendor must pass to the
vendee. As such, the vendee not only has the naked right to a
servitude, the exercise of which is conditioned on the happening
of a future event, but also a vested interest in the mineral rights
which assures him that at some future date, irrespective of time
(so long as the obstacle remains), and irrespective of the actions
of the landowner, he will be vested with ownership of the same.
This would have the effect, in the principal case, of rendering the
joint lease between the landowner and the servitude owner null
and void as to the second vendee; because in joining in the lease,
the landowner must deal with the reversionsary interest, of which
he has none.16
From what has been said, it appears that the doctrine of ac-
cretion, which requires that the vendee obtain no right whatso-
ever by his purchase, and the doctrine of obstacle, which requires
that the vendee acquire some right to the exercise of which there
exists an obstacle, cannot be jointly applied to the same case. One
must give way to the other. As it is the belief of the writer that
the vendee acquires an interest in the mineral rights by his pur-
chase, the obstacle theory, in his opinion, should prevail.17
E. L. L.
16. The landowner would again be dealing with something of which he
has no ownership, title having passed to the second vendee. Recordation of
the sale by the second vendee would, as to him, annul any attempt by the
landowner to prejudice his rights.
17. For a contrary view concerning the question discussed in this note,
see Comment (1942) 5 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 115. The author there takes the
position that as a servitude was already outstanding on the land, the second
vendee could not by his purchase acquire another servitude on the same tract
of land. And, as Article 792 speaks only of obstacles to existing servitudes,
that doctrine is not applicable to this case.
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